This paper places social citizenship momentum into the context of squaring the welfare circle for examination. Citizenship is a powerful world-level organizing principle especially by the minority groups for their claim of equal treatment. The squaring of welfare circle refers to the need of the governments to constrain their budgets but also meet the rising demands from and needs of their people. This comparative study looks at the attitudinal findings of two Chinese societies of Hong Kong and Taiwan to see whether or not the cultural factor can mitigate the momentum of social citizenship rights and the demand side of the welfare circle. Implications for social policy are also discussed.

Keywords Chinese welfare; culture; social citizenship; welfare circle; welfare rights

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Introduction

This article examines social citizenship momentum in the context of squaring the welfare circle dilemma. It explores whether or not the attitudinal findings of a comparative study of two Chinese societies, Hong Kong and Taiwan, can generate insights about factors that mitigate the momentum of social citizenship and the demand side of the welfare circle. Social citizenship momentum is conceptualized as a gap between the high ideals of social citizenship rights and the relatively low practice of these rights. The squaring of the welfare circle refers to the need of governments to constrain their budgets but also to meet the rising demands from and the needs of their people, while simultaneously maintaining popular legitimacy (Bonoli, George, & Taylor-Gooby, 2000; George & Miller, 1994; George & Taylor-Gooby, 1996). In theory the gap between the ideal and actual practice generates a social momentum that begins to narrow the gap due to the powerful moral appeal of social citizenship on the basis of egalitarian principles (Faulks, 2000;
Lister, 2007). The rights-based concept of citizenship, in which the concept of social citizenship is one of its three components (Marshall, 1950), first emerged historically in the European experience of state formation (Wong, 1999, p. 97). It has become powerful with the development of the liberal tradition (Faulks, 2000, p. 3). This is not to deny that social citizenship can be simply a self-interested act, legitimized through claiming citizenship rights. For example, theorists on the left of the ideological spectrum, such as Offe and Habermas, are critical about rights-based concepts of social citizenship because they are demoralizing. Offe (1996, p. 110) warns about the danger of institutions based on rights as being transformed into “nothing more than welfare-maximizing machines” even where they are just or reasonable. Habermas (1992, pp. 10–11) notes critically that the existing institutions of the welfare state promote passive dependency on welfare: there is a clientalization of the citizen role.

However, in the history of citizenship, citizenship as part of a global discourse of human rights and social citizenship, in particular, has been very powerful as a worldwide organizing principle in legal, scientific, and popular conventions in the post-war period (Soysal, 2001, p. 67). Particularly for minority groups, citizenship in general and social citizenship in particular provide them with moral ammunition for claiming that their unequal treatment is, in fact, an encroachment of their rights. In this light, citizenship rights can become the benchmarks against which minorities can argue for their equal treatment and basic human rights (Faulks, 2000, p. 3). According to Marshall (1950, p. 8), social citizenship rights are about the range of guarantees “from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live a life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.” However, social citizenship rights require resources or actions for their implementation. As van Steenbergen’s (1994, p. 3) states, this is one requirement of an active or even an interventionist state.

The current reality of economic globalization, however, constrains the active state; hence, national governments in developed welfare states find it harder than before to square the welfare circle (Bonoli et al., 2000; George & Miller, 1994; George & Taylor-Gooby, 1996).

The squaring of the welfare circle dilemma reflects the drastic social and economic changes welfare states are now facing: aging populations, shifting labour markets, economic globalization, and weakened family structures. Being able to square the welfare circle is not only about additional resources but also about managing public expectations. In this light, the welfare circle dilemma connects to the citizenship momentum as the latter is likely to fuel the demand side of the welfare circle dilemma. It is also the case that the citizenship momentum and the demand side of the welfare circle can be mitigated if public expectations are moderated by cultural factors such as beliefs about personal and family responsibilities of welfare.

Despite the powerful moral appeal of social citizenship, it is inherently limited by contextual constraints. This is the theoretical source of the recent ascendance of pessimism over the application of social citizenship in the EU, which many observers see as the decoupling of economic integration and social security (Faist, 2001; Schmitter & Bauer,
2000; Streeck, 1996, p. 64). Schmitter and Bauer (2000, p. 1) observe that, “the European Union has made only fitful and erratic progress in defining its social citizenship” as compared with “the resounding (if rather vacuous) commitment in the Treaty of Maastricht to political citizenship”. Even in Nordic social democracies like Finland and Sweden, social citizenship rights have become weaker since changes were introduced in both countries in the 1990s to tightly link earnings-related benefits to contributions, thus diminishing the role of universal benefits (Timonon, 2001, p. 29).

However, it is fairly important to determine whether this pessimistic view about the application of social citizenship rights is confined to undeveloped societies. Undeveloped societies vary. They range from low-income societies in Africa and the Indian subcontinent to the wealthier tiger economies in East Asia. In this article we chose two tiger economies, Taiwan and Hong Kong, both of which are Chinese, for close scrutiny. A literature review found that these two societies are wealthy but have less mature welfare systems in terms of social expenditure, the scope of provisions and the generosity of benefits than their western counterparts (Jacobs, 1998; Lin, 1999; Walker & Wong, 2005). In other words, they are likely to face rising demands for social welfare like other advanced industrial societies embedded in the welfare circle dilemma; for example, see the case of Hong Kong as illustrated in Wong (2008).

However, these two Chinese societies have a Confucian tradition. Confucianism does not see individuals as atomistic, autonomous beings with enforceable claims against the state and their community. Instead, individuals are people in the context of a social network within which these rights and responsibilities arise (Nuyen, 2002, p. 134). Hence, the idea of a citizenship that exists primarily for the protection of individual rights is not part of the Chinese philosophical tradition (Goldman & Perry, 2002, p. 1; Wong, 1999). In Hong Kong encouraging the Chinese to adhere to their cultural tradition has been part of government policy. This entails that people are discouraged from relying upon social welfare and encouraged to have a stronger sense of family responsibility; and government is expected to assign a greater role to meeting the social welfare needs of the family and the third sector (Chau & Yu, 2005, pp. 32–4; Walker & Wong, 2005, p. 215).

A similar emphasis on family responsibility as a benign excuse for minimal or limited government intervention is also evident in Taiwan (Hill & Hwang, 2005, p. 160; Lin, 2006). Given these facts, are the Chinese societies of Hong Kong and Taiwan different from developed countries in terms of their social citizenship rights and the welfare circle dilemma? Does this mean that the momentum for social citizenship rights is reduced? It is the aim of this article to look at these questions through a comparative study of attitudinal findings of Hong Kong and Taiwan.

The contributions of the cultural factors

One merit in comparing social policy is distinguishing between general and specific ideas (Higgins, 1981). As Hill (2006, p. 11) suggests, one must determine whether the claim of some measure of universality in a comparative analysis of social policy “may only be applied in a static way to one society at one point of time”. Hence, the Chinese context,
in which people believe more in self-reliance, families and responsibilities over rights, should be a good testing ground to determine whether different cultural contexts counteract the momentum of social citizenship rights and the demand side of the welfare circle.

Taiwan and Hong Kong are rich Chinese societies. Both have a relatively high GDP per capita (US$15,668 and US$25,191, respectively in 2005) (Hong Kong Government, 2006; Republic of China Taiwan, n.d.). Their high economic standards have an added value. According to the convergence theory, industrialization, urbanization and high economic standards are likely to fuel rising demands for social welfare (Hill, 2006, pp. 17–18; Mishra, 1977, pp. 33–42; Rimlinger, 1971). In other words, the study of these two wealthy Chinese societies can highlight the contribution of cultural factors.

Despite the fact that Hong Kong and Taiwan are both Chinese societies they have different political and welfare systems. The political system of Hong Kong, being a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, is much less democratic than Taiwan in terms of electing the head of government and members of the legislature. However, both societies have similar levels of social expenditure as a share of the GDP (Hong Kong, 10.1% and Taiwan, 11.1%, 2005) (Hong Kong Government, 2006; Republic of China Taiwan, n.d.). In terms of the nature of its welfare system, Hong Kong is residually oriented in social policy, following a neoliberal trajectory (McLaughlin, 1993; Walker & Wong, 1996; Wong, 2008), whereas Taiwan has followed a corporatist path in its welfare regime development (Goodman & Peng, 1996; Hill & Hwang, 2005).

The findings of the comparative study have significant theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, they verify whether Confucianism or similar cultural values such as Victorian and American values, which share similar moral tone, are a countervailing force to the egalitarian moral power of social citizenship and as a brake to the demand side of the welfare circle. Practically, they indicate that Chinese societies or societies with similar cultural backgrounds are more advantageous than their developed society counterparts in terms of mitigating the demand for social welfare fueled by social citizenship rights and the demand side of the welfare circle.

The two opinion surveys and measurement

Both the Taiwan and Hong Kong surveys used a similar set of questions on social citizenship, but the Hong Kong survey used a longer questionnaire that covered all three dimensions of citizenship. However, only the questions on social citizenship are compared here. The Hong Kong study was undertaken in 2002. It used face-to-face interviews with 712 adults, aged 18 and above, who were selected using a stratified random sampling method. The sample was representative of the larger population in terms of key variables, including age, household income, gender, and occupation, all listed in the 2001 population census. The Taiwan study was undertaken in 2005. It used telephone interviews due to its shorter questionnaire and only questions about social citizenship were asked. Proportional allocation sampling was used to select respondents from Taipei City and Taipei
County, since the socioeconomic characteristics of these two areas are relatively comparable with those of Hong Kong. In the end, a sample size of 1,029 adults, aged 18 and above was achieved.

Both studies aimed at responding to two types of statement: “Citizens should have rights (or responsibilities) in a specified area” and “In practice, Hong Kong/Taiwan people have rights (or responsibilities) in a specified area”. The first statement is designed to elicit the perception of an ideal, while the second, a perception of the actual practice of social citizenship in each respective Chinese society. In Hong Kong, five components of social citizenship include work, basic education, a guarantee of basic living standards, parental care of children and government making good use of public money at both ideal and practical levels. However, the Taiwan survey adds the “care of parents” component into the social citizenship concept because of its filial piety value.

Despite this inclusion, the reliability of the respective tests by Cronbach’s alpha are acceptable or satisfactory, except for the somewhat low values of 0.5213 in practical rights in Taiwan and 0.5843 in ideal rights in Hong Kong. Apart from these, the values of the other six variables are acceptable, for example, 0.7321 in practical responsibilities and 0.8354 in practical rights in Hong Kong (Table 1). These statistical findings show that the scales used in both studies, despite their different completion times, are real social citizenship constructs. The exact wording of each component of all social citizenship variables are reported in the findings session.

### The findings

The findings of each study are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents the frequencies of the responses to the five or six components of social citizenship on both ideal and practical levels (i.e., in terms of expectation and practice) and along two dimensions (i.e., that people’s rights and responsibilities).

The first column on the ideal level between rights and responsibilities is viewed first. The frequencies of the first three components, work, basic education and a guarantee of basic living, are all high, while rights are matched with responsibilities in both societies. For the next three components (two for Hong Kong), parental care of children, children caring for parents and government making good use of public money/everyone should have the responsibility of paying taxes, there are more ideal responsibilities than ideal rights. In summary, on the ideal right–responsibility level, the two Chinese societies expect somewhat more responsibilities or are somewhat “rights deficit”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Alpha reliability of social citizenship variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal rights</td>
<td>0.5843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal responsibilities</td>
<td>0.6232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical rights</td>
<td>0.8354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical responsibilities</td>
<td>0.7321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 Comparison of Taiwan’s and Hong Kong’s respondents’ views on social rights and social responsibilities for ideal and practical levels (% of agree/strongly agree)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right/responsibility</th>
<th>Ideal level</th>
<th>Practical level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Everyone should have a right to a job/everyone should be responsible for working for one’s own living.</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Everyone should have the right to basic education/parents should be responsible for providing basic education to their children.</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Everyone should be guaranteed basic living needs/everyone should be responsible for guaranteeing their basic living needs.</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>87.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Parents have the right to ask for government assistance for the care of children/parents have the duty to care for their children.</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Adult children have the right to ask for government assistance for the care of parents/adult children have the duty to care for their parents.</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Everyone has the right to expect government to make good use of public money/everyone has a responsibility to pay taxes</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. For the Taiwan data, four-point scales from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” were used to answer questions about expectations of society. Questions on the practice of social rights and responsibilities were also evaluated using a four-point scale: “most people”, “half and half”, and “a few” to “none”.  
2. For the Hong Kong data, five-point scales; “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “fair”, “agree”, and “strongly agree”, were used to answer questions about expectations for social rights and responsibilities. Questions on the practice of social rights and responsibilities are evaluated using a three-point scale, from “most people”, “half and half”, “few” to “none”.
Among the ideal levels of rights, a proportion of respondents in both societies believe their right to ask government to take care of their children is relatively low, compared to other levels of rights and ideal responsibility (75.2% in Taiwan and 41.4% in Hong Kong on the ideal right level; 96.3% in Taiwan and 97% in Hong Kong on the ideal responsibility level). The results show that people in both societies are somewhat ambivalence about expecting government assistance in taking care of their children. These societies evidently experiencing a responsibility-surplus phenomenon. The right-responsibility gap is widened even further in the case of Hong Kong (97% responsibility vs 41.4% right), which favors the government. Family values in Chinese culture can still be found, however, it is more common in Hong Kong than in Taiwan for parents to ask the government for help in caring for their children.

In the second column, showing the rights and responsibilities between the two Chinese societies, a more complicated picture is seen than the first column. As for work, both societies perceive themselves as having more practical rights than practical responsibilities; perhaps people regard themselves as not being sufficiently hardworking. On the level of responsibility, the statement was as follows: “Everyone has the responsibility to work for their own living”. This may indicate that Taiwan and Hong Kong are still dominated by a traditional work ethic: people see themselves as having a greater right to a job than a responsibility to work hard to earn their own living.

### Table 3 Comparisons between expectations and practice of rights and responsibilities between Taiwan and Hong Kong

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean t</td>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Expectations of social rights</td>
<td>16.75–9.526*** 1018</td>
<td>2.76 – 17.621*** 574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectations of social responsibilities</td>
<td>17.27</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Social rights in practice</td>
<td>15.27–11.618*** 1008</td>
<td>2.23 – 12.693*** 487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social responsibilities in practice</td>
<td>16.38</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Expectations of social responsibilities</td>
<td>17.26–7.819*** 1016</td>
<td>2.95 – 25.340*** 617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social responsibilities in practice</td>
<td>16.37</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social rights in practice</td>
<td>15.28</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. For Taiwan’s data, four-point scales, from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”, are used to answer questions about expectations of social rights and responsibilities. Questions on the practice of social rights and responsibilities also use a four-point scale, from “most people”, “half and half”, “a few” to “none”.
2. For Hong Kong’s’s data, five-point scales from “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “fair”, “agree”, “strongly agree” were used to answer questions about expectations of social rights and responsibilities. Questions on the practice of social rights and responsibilities were on a three-point scale, from “most people”, “half and half”, “a few” to “none”.

***$p < 0.001.$

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However, one still can find differences between these two societies in the work component. Fewer respondents in Hong Kong (43.4% in Hong Kong, compared to 68.7% in Taiwan) think their right to work has been fulfilled. This may be because in 2002 Hong Kong had a higher unemployment rate of 7.3%, compared to Taiwan’s 2005 rate of 4.4%.

For the next four components (three for Hong Kong), basic education, a guarantee of basic living expenses, the care of children and the care of parents, more practical responsibilities than practical rights are indicated. For instance, on both rights and responsibilities, the Chinese in both societies experience a responsibility surplus, which includes more responsibility on the part of the people and less on the part of the government (12.9% in Taiwan and 27% in Hong Kong for the practical right of asking for government assistance for child care, compared with 61.5% in Taiwan and 62.8% in Hong Kong of the practical duty to provide child care).

As mentioned before, a question on the care of elderly parents was not included on the Hong Kong questionnaire, but the Taiwan response pattern was very similar to that of rights and responsibilities for child care; more responsibility is needed to fill the right–responsibility gap. This gap may indicate that people view themselves as having less rights in relation to agents of the state for either child care or the care of elderly parents and more responsibility for these two family responsibilities. This finding has significant implications for relationship in the welfare circle dilemma. The squaring of the welfare circle indicates that people expect more rights. This theoretically generates a demand for social welfare. If the Chinese people expect more responsibilities than rights in relation to family care, either for children or for elderly parents, then cultural factors will seemingly mitigate pressure on the welfare circle.

As the last component, “government is making good use of public money/everyone is responsible for paying taxes”, people in these two Chinese societies offered different responses. Taiwan Chinese people see themselves as having a rights surplus. Perhaps this is a result of the political experience of a developed world style of democracy at work. The Hong Kong Chinese people are on the opposite side of the spectrum. They see themselves as having more responsibility to pay their taxes. In return, due to the lack of a political democracy, they do not have the right in practice to pressure government on the prudent use of public money. In a nutshell, there is generally a greater responsibility surplus than a right surplus in practice social citizenship for these two Chinese societies.

Table 3 provides another angle for viewing the same two sets of data. However, by aggregating all the frequencies of the five or six components of the levels of social right or social responsibility into the mean and then comparing them by using a $t$-test, it has been found that people living in both Taiwan and Hong Kong exhibit similar orientations towards social citizenship. On an ideal level, they take upon themselves more social responsibilities than social rights; on the practical level, they have take more practical social responsibilities than practical social rights. When studying expected social rights and practical social responsibilities, they have more practical social responsibilities; between practical and expected social rights, they have more practical social rights. All $t$-tests conducted on the above pairs were found to be statistically significant.
The findings from Taiwan and Hong Kong both support the optimistic view that social citizenship rights will retain their momentum due to their strong moral power for social equality. However, the moral power of social citizenship rights is likely to be constrained by social citizenship responsibilities on both ideal and practical levels.

In conclusion, the findings of aggregate statistical analyses by \( t \)-testing shown in Table 3 are clear and straightforward. People in these two Chinese societies are similar in terms of the match between social citizenship practice and expectations. It was found in the Hong Kong and Taiwan surveys that these Chinese people normally have a rights deficit and a responsibility surplus. Both societies attained higher than expected scores for ideal social citizenship rights and lower practical social citizenship rights. This gap between ideals and practice provides a momentum for narrowing the gap. Both societies also have a responsibility surplus. This means that their evaluation of their responsibilities in principle serves as a brake to the welfare circle dilemma on the demand side of the relationship that underlies developed welfare states.

**Conclusion and reflections for social policy**

In both Taiwan and Hong Kong the empirical findings of opinion surveys on social citizenship are found to be similar, despite their different political and welfare systems. Taiwan is more democratic than Hong Kong; its welfare system has followed the corporatist path while Hong Kong is more residual-oriented. However, both societies have similar levels of social expenditure as a share of GDP. These two Chinese societies, have similar family values in caring, although it is more common in Hong Kong than in Taiwan for parents to ask the government for help in caring for their children. Nevertheless, the identification of these family values strengthens the claim that cultural factors play a role in mitigating the momentum of social citizenship rights and the demand side of the welfare circle. The Chinese expect more responsibilities than rights in relation to family care, both for children and for elderly parents. The empirical findings also confirm that social citizenship rights do not lose their momentum despite the strong traditional values of responsibility, family and self-reliance that these Chinese societies have.

Perhaps this comparative study cannot confirm that the immature welfare systems, in both societies, in terms of social expenditure, are a result of these attitudinal orientations or, as suggested by some observers, that their governments simply use their cultural legacy as a “convenient excuse, with persuasive historical and cultural camouflage, to filter responses to social welfare needs” (Walker & Wong, 2005, p. 215). For example, social assistance recipients in Hong Kong are required to undertake community services in exchange for their benefits in order to preserve the self-reliance orientation (Social Welfare Department, 1998). The Taiwan government is particularly harsh towards recipients of employable social assistance: even though they do not earn anything, the government still calculates their earnings on the basis of the official minimum wage. Apparently, this policy initiative aims to create hardship under the camouflage of encouraging self-reliance. Nevertheless, both societies are wealthy but have low levels of social expenditure, confirming the claim that the demand side of the welfare circle dilemma could be
somewhat reduced if a cross-cultural analysis is taken. The greater wealth in these societies does not necessarily result in the demand for greater social welfare as has been attained in developed welfare states, as predicted by the convergence theory of industrialization and urbanization. Hence, cultural factors requires attention if squaring the welfare circle is a significant policy goal, especially in today’s globalized economy.

Perhaps further explanations of economic influences are needed, as well as an investigation of mainland Chinese to see whether it exhibits similar welfare orientations in terms of mitigating the momentum of social citizenship rights and the demand side of the welfare circle. This would give added value to the findings in this study. However, this comparative analysis of Hong Kong’s and Taiwan’s attitudinal data has already provided adequate empirical evidence for the merits of cultural legacy to explain the countervailing force to the powerful momentum articulated by the universal appeal of social citizenship rights, especially in the case of child and elderly care.

From a practical vantage point, it seems that both Chinese societies have a greater chance of striking a proper balance between social rights and social responsibilities; as their citizens have responsibility surplus attitudes and beliefs. How does this reflect on social policy?

First of all, European pessimism over the application of social citizenship is perhaps a temporary setback or a reflection of the inherent nature of social citizenship heightened by economic globalization. This momentum is still present, even in its most hostile ground: Chinese people are said to have an aversion to the welfare state (Chau & Yu, 2005; Walker & Wong, 2005, p. 215). In other words, the momentum for social citizenship rights is still a driving force for social equality, in spite of the fact that it needs to adjust to different social realities.

Second, the Chinese cultural heritage of self-reliance, family, and responsibility does not necessarily contradict the belief of the universal appeal of social citizenship rights for social equality (Wong & Wong, 2005). Nevertheless, the Chinese people are still part of a cultural heritage that believes in social responsibility. This co-existence has significant policy implications. It sheds light on squaring the welfare circle, as the demand side can be countervailed by traditional values of responsibility, family, and self reliance.

Last, it is important to realize that a cultural heritage can be eroded by institutional arrangements. Cultural heritages similar to Confucianism, such as Victorian and American values are found in developed societies as well. However, they are no longer sufficiently valued to avoid the pitfalls in welfare systems. This raises a warning signal for the erosion of traditional cultural heritage.

Culture is variable, not fixed and long lasting. Problems facing mature developed welfare states today may not necessarily be replicated in the future for Chinese and other developing societies if appropriate cultural variables are identified and are integrated well into welfare systems. For instance, in order to tackle the moral hazard of welfare dependence, the Singaporean government has introduced a work bonus and “workfare” income supplement in 2006 and 2007, respectively, to encourage economically inactive low-skilled workers to enter and stay in the workforce because work, through these policy initiatives, is made financially worthwhile (Poh, 2007). As mentioned above, Hong
Kong and Taiwan have made policy initiatives to avoid moral hazard for the sake of preserving their cultural heritage.

Similar policy initiatives are also found in developed societies. For example, the earned income tax credit of the USA is an initiative that helps low-income workers. The thrust of this policy initiative is an attempt to align rights with responsibility. These types of government aid, or rights, reinforce the belief that work, and responsibility, are matched with earning, which offers a better deal than welfare. In summary, it takes policy changes on the part of the state to establish institutional arrangements that keep cultural heritage alive in new social and economic contexts.

References


